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ABSTRACT
The following paper deals with US policy toward the Baltic states at two dif-
ferent time periods (1918–20 and 1989–91) and by two very different presidents 
(Woodrow F. Wilson and George H. W. Bush). The first period represented the 
time that saw the emergence of the United States on the world stage. Woodrow 
Wilson seemingly advocated self-determination as was understood by a num-
ber of his advisers at the Peace Conference, but eventually decided to support 
the unity of Russia as part of an anti-Bolshevik policy. During the second pe-
riod, George H. W. Bush negotiated a settlement to end another conflict, the 
Cold War. While self-determination of the Baltic states (on the basis of the US 
non-recognition policy) was not of prime importance for the US, it nevertheless 
was brought up at every summit meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev and came 
to be linked to the resolution of economic issues between the two major pow-
ers. Ultimately the restoration of independence was decided by developments 
in the Soviet Union, but US policy made the Baltic question an international 
issue and helped resolve it peacefully.
Keywords: Woodrow F. Wilson, George H. W. Bush, national self-determina-
tion, end of the Cold War
1918–20 and 1989–91, one set of years marks the beginning years of the 
twentieth century, the other, in effect the closing years of the short century 
(1914–91) that began with World War I and concluded with the end of the 
Cold War. The century came to be an American century as the United States 
emerged on the world stage in the aftermath of World War I as the world’s 
largest economy that had financed the Entente war effort. The United States 
was one of the four major victorious powers at the end of the First World 
War that then participated in the post-war Paris Peace Conference. In 1991 
the United States stood alone as the world’s sole super power. How did the 
United States shape international relations in the world as a result of its 
rise to world power status? How did the United States envisage the world 
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at its moment of triumph in the Cold War? Where were the Baltic States 
and Estonia in this world? 
The aim of the paper is to provide a comparative framework for helping 
us analyze US policy toward Estonia and the Baltic States during these two 
very different periods. What are the similarities and differences or conti-
nuities and discontinuities in US policy? We will then review the events 
themselves in this comparative perspective. 
We will start the comparative analysis with a review of the key person-
alities. To begin with the presidents: the newly elected president in 1989 was 
George H. W. Bush who, at the time of his assumption to office, was unusu-
ally well-versed on issues of foreign policy for an incoming president. Born 
in the Northeast of the United States, he was the son of a Republican US 
Senator from Connecticut. He had served as a naval pilot in World War II 
in the Pacific. Upon graduation from Yale University Bush moved to Texas 
where he pursued at first a career in the oil business. In 1966 he was elected 
a Republican Congressman from a district in Texas. Subsequently he served 
as the US ambassador to the United Nations, Chairman of the Republican 
National Committee, US envoy to China, Director of the CIA, and then as 
Vice-President during Ronald Reagan’s two terms as president (1981–89). 
By contrast, Woodrow Wilson was a southern Democrat, born in Vir-
ginia, the son of a Presbyterian minister. He grew up in the South and 
graduated from Princeton. After a short stint as a lawyer, Wilson entered 
the world of academe and taught at a number of colleges and universities. 
In 1902 he was elected President of Princeton University. He next served a 
two-year term as the Democratic Party governor of New Jersey (1910–12) and 
then was elected President of the United States in 1912 receiving only 42% of 
the vote in a three-person race. His experience in international affairs was 
minimal. In fact, his major accomplishments during his first term came 
in the field of domestic reform – the establishment of the Federal Reserve 
System (US Central Bank) and shaping anti-monopoly business law (Clay-
ton Anti-trust Act). When World War I broke out in 1914 he tried hard to 
maintain US neutrality. Wilson was re-elected president narrowly in 1916 
on the slogan: “He kept us out of war.” Yet on 2 April 1917 Wilson called 
for a declaration of war against Germany on the issue of “freedom of the 
seas” that was being violated by a German declaration of unrestricted sub-
marine warfare in the Atlantic Ocean. Following Congressional approval, 
the Declaration of War on Germany was issued on 6 April 1917. 
The team of foreign policy advisers chosen by George Bush proved 
able to work cohesively as a team. They were backed up by a sizable staff 
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of experts on Soviet, European, and Asian affairs. Bush’s Secretary of State 
was his personal friend James Baker from Texas. Baker had served as Ron-
ald Reagan’s Chief of Staff in 1981–85 and then as Secretary of Treasury in 
1985–88. The National Security Adviser for Bush was Gen. Brent Scowcroft, 
who had previously served in that position under President Ford. 
Woodrow Wilson lacked the staff available to George Bush. His Secre-
tary of State from 1915–19 was Robert Lansing, an expert in international 
law. Lansing’s positions on major foreign policy initiatives of Woodrow 
Wilson, like the League of Nations, often departed from Wilson’s views. 
Wilson kept him because of his expertise in international law, despite the 
fact that Wilson at times disparaged Lansing’s legalistic approach to inter-
national relations. The State Department under Lansing was much smaller 
in size and lacking in depth and expertise when compared to the Depart-
ment of James Baker. There was no National Security Council in existence 
during Wilson’s time. In a sense Wilson’s personal adviser, Col. Edward 
House from Texas, served as a prototype National Security Adviser, advis-
ing Wilson on foreign affairs and representing Wilson in negotiations 
with foreign governments. In 1917–18 House gathered around him a body 
of experts, the Inquiry, drawn from the academic world of universities to 
prepare the United States for the peace treaty negotiations following the 
war. Many members of the Inquiry team travelled to Paris for the Ver-
sailles Conference where they served as American members on various 
committees set up by the Versailles negotiators. Gradually in the course 
of 1919 Col. House lost favor with Wilson, and by the time of the signing 
of the Versailles Peace Treaty he was no longer being consulted by Wil-
son. Needless to say, there was no CIA to provide intelligence information 
nor assessments. However, another important official, the American Food 
Administrator Herbert Hoover, while serving under Wilson, was in a posi-
tion to quite independently set up his own network of agents to supervise 
food aid and engage in other economic activity involving finance, ship-
ping, land transportation, etc. all over Europe, including the Baltic States, 
Finland, and Poland.1
What was the Baltic question for these two very different US admin-
istrations? For the Bush administration the issue involved existing US 
policy. The Baltic states had existed as independent states in the period 
between the two world wars. The United States had not recognized the 
Soviet annexation of 1940. All of the US officials who dealt with foreign 
affairs were aware of this fact. Besides this, support in Congress existed 
1  Hoover generally used the term “Baltic states”. 
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for this policy. In conversations with Soviet officials the Baltic issue was 
usually framed in terms of non-recognition, a matter of legal principle. At 
a deeper level the Baltic States were included in the area where “self-deter-
mination” was to be applied.2 
How was the Baltic question framed by Wilson and his administration? 
The issue was new, unlike the claims of Poland and of the nationalities of 
the Austro-Hungarian empire.3 The Baltic question arose in international 
affairs during the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations where the argument 
over the future of the Baltic territory was carried out in the language of 
national self-determination. Wilson did not use the phrase “self-determina-
tion” in his Fourteen Points speech. Yes, he had talked about “government 
by consent of the governed” in his previous speeches, but this is not quite 
the same thing as “self-determination”. It was in a speech that he gave on 
11 February 1918 that he for the first time used the phrase “self-determina-
tion”. It is a phrase that he apparently adopted from the language used in 
the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. From this point onwards, the interpretation 
of nationalists around the world was that Wilson was talking about the 
application of universal national self-determination. 4 This indeed became 
the essence of how Wilsonianism came to be defined. There was a Baltic 
connection in this speech. 
The Baltic issue for US officials in 1919, thus became an issue framed by 
the concept of “self-determination.” Self-determination was used in Central 
Europe by the United States in recognizing the new states that emerged as 
a result of the collapse of empires. However, numerous US officials, includ-
ing Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State, were uneasy with the term and 
rejected its universal application as well as its application to the Baltic states. 
What was the importance of the Baltic question among other prob-
lems during the two periods? For the Bush period, we may divide foreign 
2  George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A world transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1998), 206. Bush and Scowcroft noted: “Of the internal turbulence, the states which most 
concerned us, and which would most affect the US-Soviet relationship in the coming 
months, were the Baltics. Their national aspirations symbolized the self-determination 
we supported throughout Eastern Europe and Germany. The Baltics were an emotional 
issue for us. They were different from any other Soviet republic or Eastern European 
state. Notwithstanding their incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940 (which we had 
never recognized), we had allowed them to maintain diplomatic legations in Washington 
representing the old states.” 
3  Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Central Europe, 1914–1918: a study in 
Wilsonian diplomacy and propaganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
4  Erez Manela, Wilsonian moment: self-determination and the international origins of 
anticolonial nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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policy topics (here we will limit ourselves to US–Soviet relations) into two 
major categories. Of prime importance were: nuclear and conventional 
arms reductions, East European anti-Communist revolutions, German 
unification, and some of the regional issues like Afghanistan and Central 
America. In late summer of 1990 the Gulf crisis, occasioned by the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, took its place among these issues. Items of second-
ary rank included human rights, economic relations, some of remaining 
regional problem areas, and the Baltic issue. 
Of prime importance for Woodrow Wilson were, or course, the estab-
lishment of a League of Nations and the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with 
Germany that was being negotiated at Versailles. For Wilson, the League of 
Nations was to provide a guarantee for a future peaceful world. With regard 
to the Peace Treaty, it was important for Wilson that the treaty follow his 
Fourteen Points peace proposal. Second-rank items for Wilson would have 
included economic questions – such as providing for European economic 
recovery through food relief, shipping, finances, and other activities of the 
Supreme Economic Council where Herbert Hoover and other American 
economic experts worked. Also of secondary importance was the problem 
of Russia – Bolshevism, the Civil War, Allied intervention, etc. The Baltic 
issue was subsumed under the latter two sets of issues. 
Let us now turn to a more detailed look at the two time periods. For 
most of World War I the United States was the world’s foremost neutral 
state. True to past traditions the Wilson administration held fast to the 
doctrine of “freedom of the seas” which meant that the United States as a 
neutral state had the right even in wartime to trade with anyone it wanted 
including the belligerents. President Wilson, elected in 1912, protested vig-
orously against the British blockade in the North Sea and also German 
countermeasures that involved submarine warfare against shipping to 
Britain. Since British shipping dominated the Atlantic trade and German 
shipping came to a halt in the war because of the dominance of the British 
navy, the United States became the major supplier of food, war materials 
and other commodities to the Entente powers: Britain, France, and Italy. 
Woodrow Wilson periodically offered his services as a peacemaker in the 
war. However, the German decision to engage in unrestricted submarine 
warfare and the sinking of several US ships led Wilson, first to break off 
relations with Germany, and then to declare war on Germany on 6 April 
1917. United States activity initially consisted of sending the US fleet to 
participate in the British North Sea blockade and voting a line of credit of 
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$10 billion to finance Entente purchases of food, supplies and armaments 
from the United States. 
As the United States increased its activity in the war effort in 1917, Rus-
sia began to retreat from its participation in the war and, following the sei-
zure of power by the Bolsheviks, the new Soviet authorities began to nego-
tiate Russia’s withdrawal from the war. In the midst of the Brest-Litovsk 
peace negotiations, on 8 January 1918, Woodrow Wilson issued his Four-
teen Points speech which outlined a rationale for continuing the war and 
set forth a set of conditions for a peace. Among the points, Point 13 called 
for a restoration of a Polish state, Point 6 for a restoration of the full ter-
ritorial integrity of the rest of Russia. A month later in a speech on 11 Feb-
ruary (the Four Principles speech) Wilson criticized the German position 
at Brest-Litovsk on the question of the Baltic provinces. It is the first time 
Wilson actually used the phrase “self-determination” and used it in the 
context of American goals in the war:5 
He (Chancellor Hertling) will discuss with no one but the representative 
of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of 
the Baltic provinces. […] 
National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated 
and governed only by their consent. ‘Self-determination’ is not a mere 
phrase. It is an imperative of action which statesmen will henceforth ig-
nore at their peril.  
Of importance to Estonia and the Baltic States is Wilson’s opposition to 
the Brest-Litovsk peace settlement. Germany would have had to have won 
the war to have held onto its gains in the east. 
If we review Wilson and American policy toward Estonia and the Baltic 
states, we may identify a number of features. First Wilson was opposed to 
German control over the Baltic provinces. This we saw in Wilson’s Four-
teen Point speech and in the Four Principles speech. However, at the end 
of the war Col. House requested that a longer document explaining the 
Fourteen Points (which was to be the basis of the Peace Treaty) be writ-
ten. The resulting Cobb-Lippmann memorandum of the Fourteen Points 
changed in particular Point Six (the policy toward Russia) by questioning 
the territorial integrity of Russia and advocated instead self-determination 
for Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians.6 This was the 
5  Woodrow Wilson, 11 February 1918, Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. by Arthur Link 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), v. 46, 291–297 (hereafter PWW). 
6  PWW, v. 51, 498–499. 
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document that Col. House, as Wilson’s representative, presented to British 
Prime Minister Lloyd-George, French Prime Minister Clemenceau, and 
the Italian Prime Minister Orlando at the armistice negotiations in Paris 
in late October and early November 1918. This memorandum was not writ-
ten by Wilson, but was approved by him, and further spread the view that 
Wilson advocated a radical self-determination for the peoples of the world. 
This interpretation proved to be mistaken. The memorandum, however, 
did have an impact on US economic policy toward the Baltic States, as it 
encouraged US officials like Herbert Hoover in their efforts to bring Esto-
nia and the Baltic States into the network of food assistance and economic 
reconstruction of Europe after the war. 
As has been noted, Wilson’s priorities proved to be primarily dedicated 
to establishing a new international order via a League of Nations and then 
in negotiating a peace treaty with Germany based on the ideas put forward 
in the Fourteen Points speech. He came to support the reestablishment of a 
Polish state and the break-up of the defeated countries of Ottoman Empire 
and eventually also Austria-Hungary. In the spring of 1919 he also sup-
port the independence of Finland. But there he stopped. While at the end 
of the war he expressed uncertainty as to whether Russia would maintain 
its cohesion, apparently by late spring and summer of 1919 he came to feel 
that a commitment to the unity of the Russian empire was the best way to 
oppose Bolshevism. Secretary of State Robert Lansing and indeed the State 
Department were committed throughout the period and even afterward to 
Russian unity and opposed any recognition of Soviet Russia throughout 
1919–20. The activity of Boris Bakhmeteff, the Russian ambassador to the 
United States appointed by the Russian Provisional Government in 1917 
and recognized by the United States until 1922, was important in shaping 
this view. Non-Bolshevik Russian politicians in exile, as well as hold-over 
Russian diplomatic representatives in various countries, could not accept 
the independence of the Baltic States. The viewpoint of the Wilson admin-
istration came to be codified in the Colby note (9 August 1920) that pro-
vided for the non-recognition of the Soviet Russian government as well 
as the non-recognition of the Baltic States.7 It was only the next admin-
istration from the opposite Republican political party that provided for 
the United States recognition in 1922, well after most other countries of 
the world. It would have been much more difficult for a Democratic party 
administration to have revised a major part of the Colby note that was 
based on the idea of the territorial integrity of the Russian empire except 
7  PWW, v. 66, 19–25. 
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for a small Poland and Finland. In 1991 the gap in recognition was a mat-
ter of days (Iceland: 22 August; United States: 2 September), while in the 
earlier period it was more than a year.8 
Now to turn to US policy of the 1989–91 period. While the original 
impulse for considering ways to end the Cold War came from Mikhail 
Gorbachev and was part of his perestroika program to revitalize the Soviet 
economic system by cutting military spending, in order to succeed Gor-
bachev needed a partner in the United States. The partners became Ronald 
Reagan during his second term in office and his Secretary of State, George 
Schultz. The primary issue was nuclear weapons. Following unsuccessful 
talks on eliminating all of the nuclear weapons at the Reykjavik summit 
of 1987, the two gradually negotiated more limited and achievable agree-
ments – the most important agreement provided for the abolition of Inter-
mediate Range missiles with nuclear warheads. Negotiations also began on 
START, the reduction of inter-continental missiles with nuclear warheads 
and were to be continued by the Bush administration. Besides arms control, 
the other major item on which Reagan-era negotiations had been conducted 
were so-called regional issues – Soviet activity in Third World countries. 
Here Afghanistan headed the list, but Central America was also important. 
Among what I have defined as second ranking issues, human rights was a 
constant theme – particular cases were brought up by Reagan. The Baltic 
issue did not surface as a topic during the Reagan period. It is instructive 
that US/Soviet negotiations began during the presidency of someone who 
was regarded as a conservative Republican president. A momentum, how-
ever, built up that continued into the next administration. 9
In November of 1988 George H. W. Bush was elected the 41st president 
of the United States. Even though he belonged to the same political party 
as Ronald Reagan and had been Reagan’s Vice President, there was very 
little carryover of high-ranking personnel into the Bush administration. 
The one major holdover was James Baker, who had been Ronald Reagan’s 
Chief of Staff and Secretary of Treasury and then became the Secretary of 
State for Bush. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who had served in that office dur-
ing the Presidency of Gerald Ford, was named National Security Adviser. 
Bush was better prepared on assuming office on foreign policy than any of 
the other twentieth-century US presidents. The three, with their advisers 
8  The United States recognized the Baltic States on 27 July 1922; Britain and France had 
recognized the Baltic States on 26 January 1921. There is a gap of a year and a half. See: 
Malbone W. Graham, Jr., New governments of Eastern Europe (New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., 1927) 287–290 and 313–314. 
9  Robert Service, The end of the Cold War (New York: Public Affairs, 2015). 
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in the State Department and the National Security Council were to form 
a remarkably cohesive team with very little of the infighting of previous 
administrations. It was a team that shared a similar world view based on a 
common understanding of the origins and course of the Cold War that had 
been the central feature for US foreign policy since the Truman adminis-
tration of the late 1940’s. The basic assumptions that were accepted by all 
of the senior officials of the Bush administration and their advisers were 
that it was the Soviet imposition of Communist regimes on the countries 
of Eastern Europe and the division of Germany that had led to the Cold 
War. They fully identified with US policy toward Western Europe in the 
late 1940’s – that is with the US economic, political, and security commit-
ment to Western Europe exemplified by the Marshall Plan and NATO. For 
them, Woodrow Wilson’s policy toward Europe following World War I, 
that was based on a withdrawal from European affairs, had been a mis-
take. Following the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty with Germany, 
the United States withdrew its military forces from Europe and ended 
war-time economic cooperation with the Entente powers. Woodrow Wil-
son wished the United States to devote its energy to the League of Nations. 
Following a six-month policy review of US negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, the Bush administration, while maintaining the agenda items of 
the Reagan-Schultz years (nuclear disarmament, regional conflicts, and 
human rights) shifted its focus. Total nuclear disarmament which Ronald 
Reagan set as a goal was dropped in favor of a partial reduction, leaving 
nuclear deterrence in place. Throughout the Cold War the United States 
had been faced with the fact of Soviet superiority in conventional forces on 
the European continent that could only be balanced by nuclear weapons. 
For the Bush administration, Reagan’s concept of a “Star Wars” missile 
shield gradually faded as a subject of discussion. Greater attention in dis-
armament negotiations came to be paid to conventional force reductions 
in Europe. Regional issues remained on the agenda as a key issue – for the 
Bush administration the focus was on Central America. 
It was clearly understood inside the Bush administration that US pol-
icy was to be guided by what was regarded as US national interests as well 
as American values and principles. Hence, for example, with regard to 
policy toward China, President Bush, while expressing outrage over the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989 that led to the deaths of hundreds 
of Chinese student demonstrators, sent signals to the Chinese leadership 
of his desire to prevent any long-term rupture in relations. US interests 
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demanded continuous interaction between China and the United States. 
Human rights, while of concern, was not the primary issue.10 
In Europe events on the ground lead the Bush administration to shift 
its primary focus to Eastern Europe in 1989 and then in 1990 to Germany. 
As developments in Poland began to unfold in June 1989 the view the Bush 
administration adopted was that working for change in Eastern Europe was 
a priority issue – since the Cold War began over the fate of Eastern Europe, 
providing self-determination to the countries of the area would eliminate 
the cause of the Cold War.11 As US-Soviet negotiations resumed after the 
pause of the first half of 1989, the attention of the Bush administration was 
directed toward remaking Eastern Europe more than the Soviet Union. 
Then to everyone’s surprise, Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in 
the fall of 1989, as one after the other the Communist party regimes gave 
way to non-Communist governments. Did the US and the Bush adminis-
tration bring this about? The US contribution was actually limited to a cer-
tain amount of morale-boosting to the peaceful nature of the changes and 
creating the atmospheric conditions that enabled Gorbachev and the Sovi-
ets to accept the transformation, by signaling that the US was not going to 
take major advantage of the developments. Modest, carefully thought-out 
steps were regarded as preferable to radical posturing. Yes, Bush and Baker 
realized that they were witnessing momentous changes in the balance of 
power in Europe. They carefully tried to nudge the changes in a direction 
that reflected US interests. Still, the bigger input into the transformations 
was the Soviet input – the example of perestroika launched by Gorbachev 
in the Soviet Union and then Gorbachev’s decision not to intervene mili-
tarily and accept the extent of the changes which surprised him as much 
as they did everyone else. Bush, in his visits to Poland and Hungary in the 
summer of 1989, was careful and modest in pushing any American agen-
da.12 As most commentators have noted, Bush preferred evolution to revo-
lution in the area. He did not need to make grand announcements nor tri-
umphal speeches. Events were going his way, and all he needed to do was 
give periodic statements of moral support. Brent Scowcroft, his National 
Security Adviser, reinforced by his counsels the voice of caution and 
10  George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A world transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1998), 86–111. 
11  Robert L. Hutchings, American diplomacy and the end of the Cold War: an insider’s 
account of U.S. policy in Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 
35–41. Robert L. Hutchings was the director for European affairs at the National Security 
Council in 1989–92. 
12  Bush, Scowcroft, A world transformed, 113–131. 
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moderation in politics. Events in Eastern Europe made it even more nec-
essary for Bush to support Gorbachev, who was raising no obstacles to the 
East European revolutions. For Bush, Gorbachev’s policy of non-interven-
tion in Eastern Europe was concrete evidence that Gorbachev was real and 
that real, irreversible changes were taking place in what had been the Com-
munist world. The Cold War, indeed was coming to an end. 
As the post-World War II political balance in Europe was breaking 
apart, events in Eastern Europe and the impact of Gorbachev’s policies 
undermined the East German Communist regime in November of 1989. 
The downfall of Honecker and the opening of the wall raised for the United 
States strategically even larger questions about Europe than changes that 
had taken place in Eastern Europe. Questions arose on German unifica-
tion, the status of Soviet armed forces in Germany, and the future of the 
alliance systems in Europe. From the beginning, Bush and US policy, in 
distinction to British, French, and Soviet policies, supported German uni-
fication. The United States had little to fear from a united Germany. Bush, 
as a result, worked with Helmuth Kohl, the West German Chancellor, to 
bring about the unification of Germany on western terms.13
German unification came to be framed in terms of “self-determination”.14 
The 2 + 4 formula in the American interpretation meant that the Germans 
would work out their destiny and the terms for unification themselves and 
not have a solution imposed from the outside by the former four occupying 
powers. When the West German political parties won the East German 
elections, the logical result was that East Germany came to be absorbed 
into a unified Germany under the West German constitution – the Basic 
Law of 1949. For Bush the most important element in the German unifica-
tion process was to anchor the united Germany into the NATO alliance. 
His major victory was to gain Gorbachev’s acceptance of this. The actual 
details of the unification process and the Soviet military withdrawal were 
to be worked out by the Germans themselves. 
While we can say that Eastern Europe and Germany dominated the US 
agenda during the first two years of the Bush presidency, other issues con-
tinued to be discussed with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. Arms reduction 
continued as one of the issues, but, as we have noted, it did not predomi-
nate in the same way as it had during the Reagan administration. Nuclear 
13  Brent Scowcroft noted: “In fact President Bush, was the first in the Administration 
to back reunification unequivocally, as well as the first Western leader – a point Kohl 
never forgot.” Bush, Scowcroft, A world transformed, 188. 
14  Hutchings, American diplomacy and the end of the Cold War, 100, 137–142. 
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arms reduction was a complex problem where each detail had to be consid-
ered and negotiated in a tedious process. Most “regional issues” (for exam-
ple, those in Africa) gradually faded into issues of secondary importance. 
Human rights issues such as emigration and economic issues that centered 
on repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment which placed restrictions on 
Soviet trade with the United States continued to be part of over-all discus-
sions. Gorbachev clearly looked to trade and investment from the West to 
help him revitalize the Soviet economy. But, as long as he was unwilling to 
undertake major economic reform in the Soviet Union, the Bush adminis-
tration was unwilling to make major financial commitments to him. The 
fear among US policy makers by 1990 was no longer over whether Gor-
bachev was a genuine reformer, but a worry on how long he was likely to 
survive in the leadership position in the Soviet Union.15 It was clearly in 
the interest of American policy makers that Gorbachev survive. 
This is the context for the Baltic issue in US policy. The issue arose, of 
course, as a result of the Baltic Revolutions of 1988–89 in the Baltic republics. 
It was the Bush administration that placed the Baltic issue on the agenda of 
international politics at the highest level. This has to have been a decision 
of George Bush himself. Indeed we have a testimonial to that from James 
Baker. One can have serious doubts whether a Michael Dukakis-led Demo-
cratic Party administration (George Bush’s opponent in 1988) would have 
made the Baltic issue a part of a negotiation process between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The earliest mention of an explanation of US 
Baltic policy to the Soviets that I have been able to find is by James Baker 
in his discussions with his Soviet counterpart, Edward Shevardnadze, in 
their November 1989 meeting at James Baker’s vacation ranch in Wyo-
ming. Here, among other topics Baker brought up the issue of the Ameri-
can non-recognition policy of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States:16
But let me also tell you that it has been US policy for over forty years 
not to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the So-
viet Union. These Baltic states were independent. There remains a very 
strong public sentiment in our country that identifies with these Bal-
tic states. I wanted him to understand that our Baltics policy was root-
ed in historical and domestic political realities, and that the President 
15  Robert M. Gates, From the shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997). Gates notes 
that already in May 1989 the CIA predictions were pessimistic on Gorbachev’s political 
survival (511). Gates was the Deputy National Security Adviser during this time. 
16  James Baker, The politics of diplomacy: revolution, war & peace, 1989–1992 (New York: 
G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), 146–147.
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could not shift away from this position even if he wanted to (which he 
didn’t in any case). 
Shevardnadze countered Baker with the standard Soviet arguments, but 
at the same time noted that force had not been used in order to stifle the 
popular front movements in the Baltic republics that were calling for inde-
pendence. The response does suggest that Soviet reluctance to use force 
in the Baltics did not necessarily rest on the opinion of the outside world. 
At the Malta Summit meeting between Bush and Gorbachev at the 
beginning of December 1989, Bush brought up the Baltic states issue at 
the last session of the conference on 3 December.17 Topics discussed at pre-
ceding sessions included humanitarian concerns, economics and trade, 
Central America, German unification, and Eastern Europe. According to 
Bush an understanding was reached at Malta that no force was to be used 
in the Baltics. This was an important development for the Baltic cause. It 
meant that US Baltic policy was to hold the Soviets to a certain standard 
of behavior in the Baltics from now onward. It again may be noted that 
Bush in negotiations with Gorbachev defined the Baltic question in legal 
terminology of non-recognition, not self-determination, and goes back to 
the fact that the Baltic States had existed in the inter-war period and had 
been recognized as states by the United States. Of course, one way the issue 
could have been resolved was through self-determination – that is the pop-
ulations of the area determine their own fate, similar to what was happen-
ing in Germany. However, US policy was to separate the Baltic republics 
from the other republics of the Soviet Union. In fact US preference was 
that the rest of the Soviet Union remain intact. This is why in most of the 
US–Soviet discussions the Baltic issue was not defined in terms of self-
determination, even though one could argue that the basis of the policy 
rested on self-determination. It is true that at times James Baker offered 
the advice to Shevardnadze that the Soviets could allow self-determination 
for the other republics as well.18 Whenever the Baltic issue was raised the 
standard response of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze was to consider the 
Baltic republics in the same light as the other Soviet republics and reject 
Baltic exceptionalism. Still, after Malta, Bush and his advisers thought that 
17  “At the following one-on-one, I went straight for the Baltics and asked Gorbachev 
about the possible use of force […]. ’But if you use force (in the Baltics) – you don’t want 
to – that would create a firestorm,’ I interjected. I pointed out that the United States 
would have to respond to any use of force by the Soviets there.” Bush, Scowcroft, A world 
transformed, 172. See also: Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the highest levels: 
the inside story of the end of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993), 163–165. 
18  Baker, The politics of diplomacy, 203. 
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a basic understanding had been reached on the Baltics to avoid force and 
let peaceful developments run their course. 
By the spring of 1990 the Baltic issue meant essentially Lithuania, as 
Lithuania following elections for a new assembly, issued a declaration of 
independence on 11 March and provoked a major crisis that had interna-
tional repercussions. The result was a mini-crisis in US–Soviet relations as 
Gorbachev responded with an economic boycott. The message from Wash-
ington was to keep repeating what was regarded as the understanding with 
Gorbachev against the use of force. The United States pursued a political 
course of the art of the possible. In the end the United States urged Lithu-
anian leaders that they follow the suggestion of President Mitterand and 
Chancellor Kohl and suspend their declaration of independence and at the 
same time urged Gorbachev to end the economic boycott and begin a dia-
logue.19 The dialogue had difficulty in getting started because Gorbachev 
was unwilling to consider independence. As he admitted in his memoirs, 
he was against any kind of separation and considered the maintenance of 
what he regarded as a renewed federation one of his primary policy goals 
for the Soviet Union. While Gorbachev seems to have had a historical 
understanding of the “nationality” problem of the Soviet Union, in prac-
tice he showed that he was really unwilling to do much to solve it. Thus, 
he fully criticized the centralism of the Soviet system which he blamed on 
Stalin and promised to change it.20 Yet, in his remarks to the Baltic lead-
ers about the Baltic area being joined to Russia since Peter the Great, and 
that the Baltic republics could not exist without economic ties to Russia, 
he showed himself incapable of dealing with the arguments of the Baltic 
leaders.21 Secretary Baker and Ambassador Matlock, who dealt with Gor-
bachev, realized that he did not have a solution for the Soviet nationality 
19  George H. W. Bush, All the best: my life in letters and other writings (New York: 
Scribner, 2013), 468. Letter from G. Bush to M. Gorbachev (29 April 1990): “[…] we felt 
that a ‘suspension’ by Lithuania of its resolution, as suggested by President Mitterrand 
and Chancellor Kohl, coupled with your willingness to meet with the Lithuanians outside 
the federation concept would be the best way to break the ice […]. Here is the basic 
reality – there is no way Congress will approve MFN (Most Favored Nation trade) under 
existing circumstances – no way at all […]. I will not be able to recommend approval.” 
It is true that Bush backtracked on MFN treaty at the May 1990 summit meeting and 
signed the treaty. Whether the treaty would have been ratified by the Senate can be 
questioned. Beschloss, Talbott, At the highest levels, 222–224. 
20  Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs, trans. by George Peronansky and Tatjana Varsavsky 
(New York: Doubleday, 1995), 326–347. 
21  Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuania independent again, trans. by Anthony Packer and 
Eimutis Sova (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 197–213. 
361Arens: United States policy toward Estonia
question.22 Both Baker and Matlock understood the force of nationalism in 
other historical situations in the twentieth century. James Baker realized 
that, while Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had a basic gut 
feeling for the seriousness of the issue, Gorbachev failed to grasp the seri-
ous nature of the problem for the Soviet Union.23 But Shevardnadze also 
argued that the Baltic republics could not be separated from the rest of 
the republics: that if the Baltics separated the others will follow. He may 
have been thinking too much about Georgia. Of course, part of the prob-
lem was that for a long time the Soviet leadership could not accept the 
truth about the secret protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact nor the 
connection between the Pact and the Soviet occupation and annexation 
in 1940.24 Hence a case for Baltic exceptionalism (the essence of the Bush–
Baker approach) could neither be made to them nor to the Soviet popu-
lation. The existence of a period of Baltic independence from 1918–40 did 
not mean much for the Soviet leadership. 
If we return again to consider issues of prime importance to the Bush 
administration, these would have been the encouragement of changes 
in Eastern Europe in 1989, then the unification of Germany in 1990, and 
throughout the period a continuous discussion on arms reductions, both 
nuclear and conventional. These issues clearly signaled the end of the Cold 
War and could clearly be connected to major US security interests. Regional 
conflicts were somewhat less important. Soviet withdrawal from Afghani-
stan had already begun during Reagan’s term as had a lessening of Soviet 
involvement in Central America. A new issue arose during the autumn of 
1990, as the Gulf crisis occasioned by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990 led to intense US diplomacy to align the Soviet Union with the US 
position. During the period this became the priority issue for US policy 
What I have labeled second-category items included human rights 
like Jewish emigration, economic relations and in particular trade, some 
of the regional problems, and the Baltic issue. These topics were always 
included in discussions and the American side put forward concrete pro-
posals, but these items did not impinge on US national security concerns. 
They could be carried into the next round of negotiations. It is important 
to note, however, that these topics were real issues in high politics and not 
just propaganda items. 
22  Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an empire (New York: Random House, 1995), 378–382
23  Baker, The politics of diplomacy, 77–78. 
24  Landsbergis’ comments on the ‘Commission for Evaluating the Non-Aggression 
Agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany,’ Landsbergis, Lithuania independent 
again, 147–151. 
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The officials of the Bush administration were realistic politicians. If we 
define politics as the art of the possible, then the difficulty of reaching a 
settlement of the Baltic issue in comparison with other questions is rather 
clear. Gorbachev was willing to deal on Eastern Europe, Germany, and 
arms reduction. Eastern Europe and Germany were regarded as outside 
the Soviet Union. He in fact had conceded them by ruling out military 
intervention. The purpose of arms reduction was to provide savings for 
the Soviet economy. The Baltic issue, however, was tied up with Soviet and 
Russian identity and internal politics. It raised questions in Gorbachev’s 
and Shevardnadze’s minds of the existence of the Soviet Union and also in 
Gorbachev’s mind of the identity of Russia – for him the Baltic states had 
belonged to tsarist Russia and had only separated because of the weakness 
of Russia during the Civil War.25 Bush and Baker were faced with a quan-
dary. They could not publicly denounce Gorbachev on this issue because 
they felt it would not lead anywhere. They knew that Gorbachev would 
be backed by the Soviet military and political establishment and would 
not accept an ultimatum. They did not have sufficient leverage with Gor-
bachev to have achieved a solution in exchange for something else.26 They 
could only play for time and hope that the circumstances would change. 
Furthermore, they began to fear that the Soviet military and conservative 
politicians would overthrow Gorbachev. They did not want to jeopardize 
agreements on the first priority issues like Germany and arms reduction, 
or even some agreements on regional issues. It is instructive that Secretary 
James Baker thought at times in terms of locking in existing agreements 
and understandings in case relations with Russia went askew and no fur-
ther progress on other agreements could be made.27 
That the Baltic question was, however, a real issue of high politics is 
shown by the willingness of the Bush administration to tie it to economic 
treaties. Traditionally US/Soviet trade (most favored-nation treatment) 
had been tied to the issue of Jewish emigration by the Jackson-Vanik 
25  Robert Service paraphrases Gorbachev’s words at the 13 February 1990 Politburo 
meeting: “He told the Politburo that Estonia had gained independence in 1920 only 
because Russia was weakened by civil war.” Politburo meeting, 13 February 1990: Anatoli 
Chernyaev Papers (RESCA), box 1b, 48. As cited in: Service, The end of the Cold War, 459. 
26  Bush noted in his diary on 28 March 1990: “Everyone wants us to ‘do more,’ […] 
but the big thing is to get through this so the Soviets and the Lithuanians get into 
negotiations, and handle it without bloodshed and force. If there is bloodshed, there is 
not a damn thing the United States can do about it and you’d have blood on your hands 
for encouraging her and inciting the Lithuanians to bite off more than they can chew 
at this point.” Bush, All the best, 466. 
27  Baker, The politics of diplomacy, 156.
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amendment. Now trade came to be also linked to the Baltic issue. During 
the seizure of the television tower by the Soviet military in Vilnius in Jan-
uary 1991 and the bloodshed accompanying it, President Bush announced 
that unless the violence ceased he would order the stopping of trade and 
investment legislation that dealt with US/Soviet economic relations. Bush 
wrote in a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev on 23 January 1991:28 
I had hoped to see positive steps toward the peaceful resolution of this 
conflict with the elected leaders of the Baltic states. […] Thus, unless you 
can take these positive steps very soon, I will freeze many elements of 
our economic relationship including Export-Import credit guarantees; 
Commodity Credit Corporation credit guarantees; support for ‘Spe-
cial Associate Status’ for the Soviet Union in the International Mone-
tary Fund and World Bank; and most of our technical assistance pro-
grams. Further, I would not submit the Bilateral Investment Treaty or 
Tax Treaty to the United States Senate for consent to ratification when 
and if they are completed. 
Whether the threat of US action (or actually, the lack of any action on eco-
nomic questions) had an impact on the situation on the ground in Lithu-
ania following the seizure of the television tower in Vilnius and the result-
ing bloodshed is difficult to say until the events have been fully researched. 
Ultimately US policy was stymied over the Baltic question. Without the rise 
of Yeltsin, who was willing to accept the separation of the Baltic States from 
Russia, how matters would have developed is hard to predict.29 Following 
the failure of the coup in August, the fact of Bush delaying US resumption 
of relations (by this time it was clear that this was simply a delay and not 
a question of whether it should be done) can be justified in two ways – as 
a continued effort to show deference to Gorbachev and help shore up his 
authority or an attempt to place on record that the Soviet Union agreed to 
recognize the independence of the Baltic states freely by itself and not be 
the last to provide recognition.30 It probably was misplaced caution since 
28  Bush, All the best, 508. 
29  Yeltsin’s joint statement with the three Baltic presidents of 13 January 1991 in: Leon 
Aron, Yeltsin: a revolutionary life (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 410–411. Also: 
Boris Yeltsin, The struggle for Russia, trans. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: 
Random House, 1994), 112–113. 
30  George Bush noted in his diary (2 September, 1991): “Today I had a press conference. 
I recognized the Baltics. I talked to the Presidents of Estonia and Latvia today, having 
talked to Landsbergis of Lithuania a couple of days ago… I told them why we waited a 
few days more. What I tried to do was to use the power and the prestige of the United 
States, not to posture, not to be the first on board, but to encourage Gorbachev to move 
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after all the 1920 Peace of Tartu between Estonia and Soviet Russia had 
been negotiated freely by Lenin and Soviet Russia. The independence of 
the Baltic States was thus again recognized by the Soviet Union while there 
was still a Soviet Union.31 
If indeed the coup had been successful in August 1991, Baltic independ-
ence would not have come about in 1991. The US non-recognition policy 
would have continued alongside a continuing unsettled situation in the 
Soviet Union, the outcome of which would have been difficult to predict. 
In fact, following criticism of Bush’s speech against Ukrainian independ-
ence in Kiev in July 1991, Scowcroft offered in defense of Bush that US still 
followed a non-recognition policy toward the Baltic States.32 After all the 
developments of the preceding two years, this was a very weak position 
and statement. 
Baltic leaders, of course, did not know that behind the scenes the Bush 
administration had been continuously raising the Baltic issue. They prob-
ably criticized Bush unfairly for not publicly speaking out more forcefully 
on the issue. In the end US policy did have an impact in helping to keep the 
Baltic issue alive, in making it clear to the Soviet leadership that this was 
an international issue and helping maintain morale in the Baltics. There 
was a price that the Soviet would have had to pay for a full-scale military 
crack-down in the Baltics – impaired economic relations with the United 
States. Robert Hutchings documented Bush’s emotional reaction which 
suggests that Bush rejected Lennart Meri’s reproach in July 1992 in Hel-
sinki that Bush had not acted forcefully enough toward Gorbachev and 
the Soviet hard-liners.33 
Robert Hutchings concludes “all’s well that ends well”. In the end US pol-
icy achieved what the goal had been – the restoration of the independence 
faster on “freeing the Baltics.” Yesterday, he did make a statement to this effect […].” 
Bush, All the best, 536. 
31  Serhii Plokhy notes that after the departure of the Baltic States, it was not a foregone 
conclusion that the rest of the Soviet Union would fall apart. Internal politics in particular 
the relations between Russia and Ukraine sealed the fate of the USSR. Plokhy argues: 
“The inability of the Soviet leaders to discriminate between the Union republics in 
constitutional terms was one of the realities of Soviet political life that George H. W. 
Bush and his advisers in Washington never fully grasped. They kept pushing for the 
independence of the Baltic republics, convinced that the Soviet Union could not only 
survive but do very well without them. Their argument was about fairness and legality 
[…].” Serhii Plokhy, The last empire: the final days of the Soviet Union (New York: Basic 
Books, 2014), 403. 
32  Service, The end of the Cold War, 489. 
33  Hutchings, American diplomacy and the end of the Cold War, 337–338. 
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of the Baltic States.34 He argues that US policy makers made clear to Gor-
bachev and Shevardnadze that the US adhered to the non-recognition pol-
icy and regarded the issue of the Baltic States differently from the rest of 
the Soviet Union. Bush thought he had an understanding with Gorbachev 
from Malta onward that force would not be used in the Baltics. Baker made 
suggestions on ways to resolve the issue – organization of referendums, 
beginning of talks on independence, etc. None of these suggestions led to 
any results. When violence came to Lithuania and Latvia, the US reaction 
was to tie the issue to economics and trade and Gorbachev was given to 
understand that US–Soviet relations would suffer as a result of the mili-
tary action. Indeed, at the Moscow summit in July 1991, Bush again urged 
Gorbachev directly:35 
I told Gorbachev that Yeltsin was advocating many of the things we want-
ed – cutting aid to Cuba, instant freedom for the Baltics. The one ac-
tion Gorbachev could take that would help his cause most in the Unit-
ed States was granting independence to the Baltics. 
Yet, it was not enough. Events on the ground, the failed coup, and the rise 
of Yeltsin were the decisive events that finally led Gorbachev to extend 
Soviet recognition to the Baltic States. 
What can we conclude about US policy at two different time periods, 
1918–20 and 1989–91? In both cases the United States dealt with the Baltics 
primarily as the area related to Russia and only secondarily in connection 
with developments in Eastern Europe. In both cases the Russia that was the 
official partner of the United States (in 1919–20: ambassador Boris Bakhme-
teff, and in 1989–91: Mikhail Gorbachev) opposed the independence of 
the Baltic States. In the earlier period US foreign policy leaders, President 
34  Hutching notes: “[...] the objectives, as we had framed them, were realized fully and 
with less bloodshed than we feared. The independence of the Baltic states was an aim from 
which we never wavered, but it was one that we balanced against other key objectives.” 
Hutchings, American diplomacy and the end of the Cold War, 337. 
35  Bush, Scowcroft, A world transformed, 509. Here I may offer a disagreement with the 
conclusion of Kristina Spohr Readman’s insightful article (Kristina Spohr Readman, 
“Between political rhetoric and realpolitik calculations: western diplomacy and the 
Baltic independence struggle in the Cold War endgame”, Cold War History, 6:1 (February 
2006), 31–32) that argues the West including the United States did not actively seek Baltic 
independence and that Bush’s primary objective was to maintain the Soviet Union. My 
argument is that Bush consistently sought to separate the issue of the Baltic States (hence 
the legal arguments) from the rest of the Soviet Union. He did not bring up the issue of 
self-determination for the other republics in his discussions with Gorbachev. Yes, he 
wanted to preserve the rest of the Soviet Union in part because of a serious worry about 
nuclear weapons and their control. 
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Wilson and both Secretaries of State, Robert Lansing and William Colby, 
and most of the State Department officials accepted the views of Ambas-
sador Bakhmeteff and White Russian generals on the need for the unity of 
Russia. In the later period, the views of the foreign policy leaders, President 
Bush, Secretary Baker, and others clearly favored the independence of the 
Baltic States. There was a heavy dose of legalism in the views of officials in 
both periods as well as statements on implementing “self-determination”. 
In neither case can we say that US policy decisively determined the 
outcome of the events. In both cases much depended on the strength or 
weakness of the Baltic national movements themselves, as well as the poli-
cies of other European states. In both cases the attitudes of political lead-
ers in Russia were important. In the earlier period, Lenin, the head of the 
Soviet Russian government, was willing to at least temporarily accept the 
independence of the Baltic States and in the second case, Boris Yeltsin, the 
President of Russia, in turn was willing to recognize the independence of 
the Baltics. In both cases, United States did play a role in bringing about 
independence. In the first case US assistance was mostly economic; in the 
second case, the aid was clearly political in pressuring the Soviet govern-
ment of Mikhail Gorbachev to hold off any violent repression, in continu-
ally bringing up the Baltic question in bilateral negotiations, and in defin-
ing the Baltic issue as distinct from the rest of the Soviet Union, until in 
the end independence was achieved peacefully. 
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Kokkuvõte: Ameerika Ühendriikide välispoliitika Eesti ja Balti 
riikide suhtes 1918–1920 ja 1989–1991
Artiklis käsitletakse Ameerika Ühendriikide poliitikat Eesti ja teiste Balti 
riikide tekkimise ajal (1918–20) ja Balti riikide taasiseseisvumise aasta-
tel (1989–91). Võrreldakse Ameerika poliitikat kahel erineval perioodil 
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maailma ajaloos ja kahe väga erineva Ameerika Ühendriikide presidendi 
poliitikat. 
Ameerika lõunaosariikidest pärit Woodrow F. Wilson valiti presiden-
diks 1912. aastal. Ta oli enne poliitikasse siirdumist olnud õppejõud mit-
mes ülikoolis ja Princetoni ülikooli president. Wilson valiti 1910 New Jer-
sey osariigi kuberneriks, kuid tal puudusid välispoliitilised kogemused. 
Presidendina püüdis ta Ameerikat Esimesest maailmasõjast eemal hoida, 
aga kui Saksamaa kuulutas välja allveelaevasõja Atlandi ookeanis, mis oli 
suunatud ka Ameerika kaubalaevade vastu, nõudis Wilson 2. aprillil 1917 
sõja kuulutamist Saksamaale. 
8. jaanuaril 1918 pakkus Wilson välja oma 14-punktilise rahuplaani. Kui 
Saksamaa mõistis, et on sõja kaotanud, aktsepteeris Saksa valitsus Wil-
soni nõutud 14 punkti. Üks nendest punktidest oli seotud Vene küsimu-
sega: sakslased pidid Venemaa territoriumilt evakueeruma. Kuigi Wilson 
ei kasutanud oma väljapakutud 14 punkti kõnes väljendit “rahvaste enese-
määramine”, toetas ta seda printsiipi oma hilisemates kõnedes, millest tek-
kis valearusaam, et Wilson tahtis maailma muuta selle põhimõtte järgi (nn 
wilsonianism). See oli tegelikult tema nõunik kolonel Edward House, kes 
pooldas liitlaste vaherahuläbirääkimistel rahvaste enesemääramise print-
siibi kasutamist Balti riikides. Järgides seda mõtet, aitas Ameerika majan-
duspoliitika, eriti Herbert Hooveri tegevus 1919. aasta kevadel ja suvel Eesti 
majandust Euroopa majandusruumi integreerida. Samal ajal jätkas riigi-
sekretär Robert Lansing ajutise valitsuse saadiku Boris Bahmetjevi mõjul 
Venemaa ühtsuse idee toetamist kui ainust võimalust kukutada bolševike 
valitsust Venemaal. 1919. aasta suvel võttis selle vaate omaks ka Woodrow 
Wilson. Ta ei toetanud enesemääramise õigust Iirimaal ega ka Baltimaades. 
Teisel vaatlusalusel perioodil oli Ameerika poliitika selgem. 1988. aas-
tal presidendiks valitud George H. W. Bush oli Ameerika ajaloos selleks 
ametiks üks kõige paremini ettevalmistatud kandidaat. Ta oli tegelenud 
Ameerika sisepoliitikaga kui kongresmen ja vabariiklaste partei komi-
tee juhataja ning välispoliitikaga kui Ameerika saadik ÜRO-s, Ameerika 
esindaja Hiinas, Luure Keskagentuuri direktor ja Ronald Reagani asepre-
sident. George Bush lõpetas presidendina Ameerika külma sõja poliitika. 
Rahvaste enesemääramise printsiip võeti taas kasutusele ja sellega õigustati 
sündmuste käiku Ida-Euroopas ja ka Saksamaal. Revolutsioonilised sünd-
mused Balti vabariikides 1988.–89. aastal tõstsid uuesti esile ka Balti küsi-
muse. Ameerika ei olnud tunnustanud Balti riikide annekteerimist Nõuko-
gude Liidu poolt (nn mittetunnustamise poliitika). President George Bush 
ja riigisekretär James Baker mainisid seda fakti igal kohtumisel Mihhail 
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Gorbatšovi või välisminister Eduard Ševardnadzega. Nad püüdsid teha 
Balti riikidest erandi, mille saatus oli lahus teistest Nõukogude Liidu osa-
dest. Selle tulemusel muutus Balti riikide küsimus kahe riigi vahel tõsi-
seks tüliõunaks. Peame siiski tähendama et Balti küsimus ei olnud Was-
hingtonile sama oluline kui näiteks tuumarelvade vähendamise küsimus, 
Saksamaa ühendamine või Kuveidi sõda Lähis-Idas. Ameerika oli valmis 
Nõukogude Liidule majanduslikke soodustusi pakkuma, kui Baltimaade 
saatus oleks rahulikult lahendatud.
Balti küsimus oli uus ja kerkis esile alles Esimese maailmasõja lõpul; 
Wilson lihtsalt ei tegelenud selle küsimusega. Bushile oli Baltikumi saa-
tus tõsine välispoliitiline küsimus algusest peale, Ameerika Balti riikide 
annekteerimise mittetunnustamise poliitika oli paigas enne, kui Bush pre-
sidendiks valiti. Pärast Esimest maailmasõda tõmbas Wilson Ameerika 
väed tagasi kodumandrile, Bush pidas aga Ameerika sõjaväe kohalolekut 
Euroopas vajalikuks. Ameerika poliitika tähtsus külma sõja lõpul seisnes 
selles, et vägivalla kasutamine hoiti minimaalsena ja külm sõda lõppes 
rahulikult. Bush rõhutas kogu aeg, et Baltimaades ei tohi vägivalda kasu-
tada: rahvaste enesemääramise printsiipi tuleb rakendada, aga ka rahu 
tuleb säilitada. 
 
